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ABSTRACT 
Behavioral genetics offers numerous opportunities to 
bridge gaps in biological research of IS and to shed light 
on the nature versus nurture debate. This study seeks to 
explain persistent weaknesses in behavioral security from 
a genetic perspective. A synthesis of current literatures on 
cognitive neuroscience, decision making, and fraud 
victimization suggests a genetic basis for user 
susceptibility to security risks such as phishing scams. 
Using the classic twin design, this study reports estimated 
heritability of behavioral security to be at least 29.15% by 
comparing concordance between 144 pairs of 
monozygotic (MZ) twins and that between 52 pairs of 
same-sex dyzygotic (DZ) twins. Zygosity of the twin 
pairs serves as the primary independent variable in the 
behavioral genetics analysis, while performance on a 
behavioral security test serves as the dependent measure. 
Implications of the study results are discussed with 
respect to IS research as well as managerial practices. 
Keywords 
Behavioral genetics, Phishing, Security, Human factors, 
Human-computer interaction. 
INTRODUCTION 
Vulnerabilities in cybersecurity are present in both 
personal realms and business settings. For example, 
employees at the grocery chain SuperValu received a 
fraudulent message notifying them about new (bogus) 
account numbers for wire transfers to two vendors, Frito-
Lay and American Greetings. The employees complied 
and sent $10 million to the fraudulent accounts1
Researchers have concentrated on two major aspects of 
security. The first area of study involves the technology, 
which includes tools for encryption, identity assurance, 
and threat discovery and elimination. However, as the 
SuperValu case illustrates, an important second area is 
behavioral security, which examines two groups of people 
involved in the threats: the perpetrators and the victims. 
Studies of perpetrators attempt to predict the likelihood of 
unleashing a threat, identifying their identity, and 
dissuading attacks by threatening likely and severe 
. Such 
cybersecurity issues, having a behavioral source, are of 
obvious concern to many businesses. 
                                                          
1 For details, please visit http://tinyurl.com/lds35bj    
punishment. Studies of victims, however, investigate what 
kinds of attacks are most persuasive (e.g., Dhamija et al. 
2006), who might fall for these attacks (e.g., Jagatic et al., 
2007; Galletta, et al., 2011), and how people might be 
better armed against them (e.g., (Kirlappos and Sasse, 
2012). 
Methods to arm people against attacks often include 
education or training. However, the effectiveness of these 
methods has been rather disappointing so far. For 
example, Weirich (2006) found no significant differences 
between two groups in their responses to a survey 
questionnaire five months after a warning flyer 
manipulation was administered, thus concluding that fear 
appeals are ineffective for behavioral security in an 
organizational setting. Herley (2009) demonstrated that 
the estimated costs of learning to create strong passwords 
and to understand URLs outweigh the actual benefits. 
User education might lack potency because of user 
misconceptions about security. Those misconceptions 
might reflect deep-rooted decision-making heuristics and 
biases, such as trust halo effect or anchoring effect, rather 
than simple lack of knowledge (Kirlappos and Sasse, 
2012). 
Individual differences in security behavior are striking. In 
many fields, especially psychology and medicine, when 
individual differences become problematic, research 
studies often attempt to assess the extent to which nature 
(biology: i.e., genetics) is more important than nurture 
(environment: i.e., training or education) to understand 
and predict those differences. In most cases, both nature 
and nurture play important roles in shaping a complex 
behavior. However, in the case of behavioral security, the 
extent of nature’s influence, compared to that of nurture, 
is largely unknown in the literature.  
The study reported here was designed on the premise that 
a better understanding of the roles of nature versus 
nurture in shaping behavioral security would help 
improve our efforts. Novel studies in areas such as 
NeuroIS (e.g., Dimoka et al., 2011), to physiological 
studies (e.g., Haney et al., 2007), and to the four drives of 
human nature (Abraham et al., 2009), the hunt for 
biological artifacts underlying cognitive processes is 
evidenced by a growing theoretical and empirical 
literature (Kock, 2004, Kock, 2009, Pirolli and Card, 
1999). However, these approaches do not tell the entire 
story; other approaches can both broaden and deepen our 
understanding of the problem.  
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Taking the novel physiological evidence and evolutionary 
psychology approaches can provide estimates for the 
population, rather than explanations for individual 
differences. Although understanding the population in 
general is important, this strategy provides little insight 
into those aforementioned factors that lead to differences 
in individual behaviors in the modern business 
environment. To estimate the potential impact of 
interventions such as training or fear appeals, it is 
important to understand the causes of those individual 
differences in the extent to which individuals have 
adopted desirable measures, have avoided risks, and have 
sensed or failed to sense an imminent risk.  
Our specific research questions therefore are: To what 
extent is security behavior malleable by environmental 
forces (e.g., interventions), versus genetic makeup? Why 
are some individuals easier prey for cybercrime than 
others? How much can training be expected to help? 
THE CASE OF BEHAVIORAL SECURITY 
The twin design, a classic behavioral genetics research 
method, can be applied to understand the role of nature 
versus nurture in the IS user’s propensity to engage in 
secure behavior. Recent studies on security behavior, such 
as diligence in backing up data files (Boss and Galletta, 
2008) and resistance to impulsive clicking on phishing 
messages (e.g., Galletta et al., 2011) reveal that, even 
after years of publicizing the need for making backups 
and avoiding clicking on phishing messages, users often 
fail to heed those warnings. Many users fail to make 
backups even after indicating an intention to do so. Many 
users also continue to click through to websites that are 
likely to be hostile, even when they have generic subject 
headers and generic text, and even if they are from 
strangers and have numeric URL links to content. 
Furthermore, some users believe outrageous claims of 
winnings, commissions for transferring large sums of 
money, or inheritances from unknown decedents. There 
might be a genetic explanation that can be found using a 
twin study. 
Common across twin studies in business research is the 
finding that genetic determinants explain a significant 
portion of individual differences in prudence (Simonson 
and Sela, 2011), risk taking (Cesarini et al., 2010) and 
cooperative behavior (Cesarini et al., 2008). Moreover, 
molecular genetics research has identified allelic 
correlates of personality traits such as novelty seeking 
(Cloninger et al., 1996). Because these traits may underlie 
many of the behavioral issues in IS security, we anticipate 
genes to play a considerable role in explaining why some 
individuals are more prone to experience security 
breaches than others. 
Preliminary findings from the limited literature on 
phishing suggest the presence of personality correlates of 
security behavior. In an experimental study, Galletta et. 
al. (2011) found that specific personality traits, such as 
financial risk propensity, distrusting stance, and the 
ability to focus, predicted the user’s propensity to click on 
a phishing message. Heritability of financial risk 
propensity, and other financial decision making 
behaviors, has been estimated to be around .25 (Cesarini 
et al., 2010). In other words, 25% of individual 
differences can be attributed to genetic variations. The 
rest can be attributed to nurture, or variations in the 
environment where these individuals have developed. 
Distrusting stance is likely to be a subset of the 
agreeableness dimension, whereas the ability to focus can 
be a manifestation of the conscientiousness dimension of 
the Big-Five Personality theory. As indicated earlier, 
heritability estimates for personality dimensions are 
reported to be around 50% in the literature with great 
consistency (Plomin and Caspi, 1999). These findings 
give strong reason to suspect that individual differences in 
IS users’ propensity to engage in secure behavior can be 
at least partially due to genetic differences. 
Studies of fraud victimization, information security, and 
behavioral genetics allude to potential genetic bases for 
behavioral security for two theoretical reasons: Risk 
taking and decision biases. Training has also been studied.  
Risk taking studies have found genetic influences on 
prudence (Simonson and Sela, 2011), risk-taking 
(Cesarini et al., 2010), novelty-seeking (Cloninger et al., 
1996), financial risk propensity (Cesarini et al., 2010), 
and financial gambling (Dreber et al., 2011).  
Decision biases also play a role. Framing, in particular, is 
one of the decision making biases that correlate with 
cognitive ability (Stanovich and West, 2008), a highly 
heritable characteristic (Plomin and Spinath, 2004). The 
framing effect was recently found to have a genetic basis 
(Roiser et al., 2009), traced to the Serotonin transporter-
linked polymorphic region (5-HTTLPR). Specifically, 
this genetic variation affects decision making biases 
driven by contextual cues and uncertainty (Roiser et al., 
2009). The amygdala plays a critical role in regulating 
dopamine levels, which influence decision making and 
choices (Rogers, 2011). Therefore, these empirical studies 
suggest that there might be a genetic basis for decision 
biases that make individuals susceptible to phishing 
schemes. 
Finally, studies have evaluated the effectiveness of 
training programs to improve the rate of secure behavior. 
Fear appeals (Boss and Galletta, 2008), anti-phishing 
educational websites (Sheng et al., 2010), PhishGuru, a 
specialized training program (Kumaraguru et al., 2009), 
and Solid training (Kirlappos and Sasse, 2012) have all 
shown low to moderate impact on secure behavior 
improvement.  
These findings suggest that both nature and nurture could 
play significant roles in shaping security behavior. By 
employing the classic twin design of behavioral genetics 
research, this study will uncover the relative contribution 
of genetic makeup versus environmental factors to 
individual differences in security behavior.   
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RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The empirical data collection efforts involved participant 
enrollment, questionnaire data collection, and a phishing 
IQ test, described below, at the annual Twins Days 
festival in Twinsburg, Ohio, the largest annual gathering 
for twins and other multiples in the world. This annual 
event routinely attracts more than 2,000 pairs of twins 
who have opportunities to participate in research studies 
and social events. Behavioral genetic researchers have 
frequently collected research data at the festival (e.g., 
Ashenfelter and Krueger, 1994, Settle et al., 2009, Wise et 
al., 2007).   
Participants 
Four hundred and five individuals participated in this 
research study. Zygosity data were missing from five 
pairs of twins, and data from the twin sibling were 
missing from three participants. The final dataset included 
a total of 196 pairs of twins, which consisted of 144 pairs 
of MZ twins, and 52 pairs of same-sex DZ twins, 
resulting in a sample size of 392 participants. The 
participants’ ages ranged from 18 to 80, (µ=33.5, 
median=27). Fifty-three (13.52%) participants reported 
having been fraud victims. 
One method of ensuring that MZ and DZ twins were 
drawn from comparable populations is to examine the 
distributions of relevant demographic measures between 
the two groups. If there are significant differences 
between the MZ and DZ twins, we would include the 
relevant variable in subsequent SEM analysis as a 
covariate. Summary statistics in Table 1 illustrate that the 
MZ and DZ twin participants are comparable in terms of 
age and gender. They are also comparable in terms of 
Facebook account ownership, and whether they have been 
fraud victims. Inferential statistics suggest no significant 
differences along any of these dimensions between the 
two twin groups. Thus, while the sample size is relatively 
small, especially for DZ twins, there appears to be no 
systematic bias in the sample that would compromise the 
resulting estimates of the SEM analysis.  
Measures 
Zygosity (i.e., whether the twins are MZ or DZ) as a 
dichotomy factor is the primary independent variable and 
is measured with an answer to the question “Is your twin 
brother/sister an identical twin? That is, are you 
monozygotic twins?” (Ashenfelter and Krueger 1994). 
Self-report measures of zygosity have been shown to 
correlate nearly perfectly with genetic verification (Wise 
et al., 2007). Therefore, this self-report item should be 
sufficient for measuring zygosity for the purpose of this 
study. Demographic information, such as gender, age, 
education, occupation, and zip-code, were also collected 
as control variables.  
The primary dependent variable for this study is the 
participant’s performance on eight questions in the 
behavioral security test discussed below. 
Procedure 
Participants answered a questionnaire regarding their 
fraud victimization experience, Internet technology usage, 
and personality assessments, as well as the eight-question 
behavioral security test. Participants were shown e-mail 
messages or webpages and asked to determine if each of 
them was legitimate or not. The participants responded to 
all stimuli on site. After both twins completed the study, a 
$10 participation fee was paid to each twin. 
RESULTS 
Performance on the behavioral security test is 
summarized in Table 1. The highest possible score on the 
test is 8. MZ and DZ twins performed at comparable 
levels, with no statistically significant difference between 
the types. 
Table 1. Total Scores (Out of 8) on the Behavioral Security Test 
 MZ twins  
(N = 284) 
DZ twins  
(N = 108) 
Inferential Statistics 
Total Score  
(range: 0 - 8) 
4.72 (1.20) 4.65 (1.10) t(360) = .524 
p = .60 
To evaluate the heritability of performance on the 
behavioral security test, two behavioral genetic analyses 
were performed. First, consistent with the classic 
behavioral genetics literature, a simple comparison of 
intra-class correlation was performed as a first test of the 
rate of twin concordance in behavior (Alford, Funk, and 
Hibbing 2005; Settle et al 2009). Our analysis reveals that 
the intra-class correlation is different for MZ twins (.51) 
and DZ twins (.32) (see Table 3). As heritability can be 
estimated as twice the difference between the MD and DZ 
correlations, h2 for the behavioral security test 
performance was estimated to be .38.  In other words, 
genetic variations account for about 38 percent of the 
variance in behavioral security test results (see Table 2).  
Table 2. Genetic and Environmental Influences on the Behavioral Security 
Test Total Scores, based on Intra-Class Correlations 
 Intra-class 
Correlation 
Heritability  
(h2 or a2) 
Shared 
Environment 
(c2) 
Non-shared 
Environment 
(e2) 
Phenotype MZ DZ 2*(MZ-DZ) (2*DZ)-MZ 1-MZ 
Total Test 
Score 
.51 .32 .38 .26 .46 
The second analysis involved more sophisticated tools 
that have recently examined the same parameters using 
covariance-based univariate SEM (e.g., Nicolaou, 2008a; 
2008b; Settle, 2009). The maximum likelihood method, as 
operationalized in the OpenMx library (Boker et al., 
2011) of the R statistical package, estimated the relative 
contributions of genetics (A), shared environment (C), 
and unshared environment (E) to twin resemblance in 
behavioral security test performance (Neale and Cardon, 
1992, Falconer and MacKay, 1996). This technique 
allows us to generate parameter estimates for the 
magnitude of the ACE components separately, along with 
the size of the errors of these estimates, while at the same 
time testing and comparing the fit of various models 
(Neale and Cardon, 1992). 
The first step is to test the full ACE model. The genetic 
effect component A measured in the model serves as a 
Chung et al.  Genetic Basis of Behavioral Security 
Proceedings of the Twelfth Annual Workshop on HCI Research in MIS, Milan, Italy December 15, 2013 
 4 
primary indicator of the genetic basis of behavioral 
security. Component A would be one if differences in 
behavioral security measures are completely determined 
by genetic variation, and zero if the measures are driven 
entirely by environmental factors. The fit of the overall 
ACE model is assessed based on Log Likelihood, and the 
Akaiki information criterion (AIC) (Akaike, 1987).  
Table 3 summarizes results for the full ACE model and 
two submodels: CE, and AE. The -2 Log Likelihood 
value and the Akaike information criterion (AIC) 
(Akaike, 1987) revealed that the best fitting model for 
explaining individual differences in behavioral security 
test performance included A, C and E. The two 
submodels (CE and AE), both lacking the genetic 
influence component A, are significantly different from 
the full ACE model. Results indicate that 29.15% of the 
variance in the dependent measure is explained by genetic 
differences. 34.96% of the variance can be attributed to 
shared environments, and 35.89% can be attributed to 
non-shared environments. 
Table 3. ACE Model Comparisons: Behavioral Security Test Performance 
Model A   C   E   -2 Log-
Likelihood 
AIC df p-
value 
ACE 29.15% 34.96% 35.89% -1365.188 -2153.188 394 -- 
CE -- 99.08% 1% -358.794 -1148.794 395 < 
0.001 
AE 100% -- 0% 717.92 -72.08 395 < 
0.001 
To summarize, both the classic intra-class correlation 
approach and more recent, more sophisticated ACE 
modeling via SEM reveal that variations in performance 
on the behavioral security test are partially explained by 
variations in genetic makeup. The first approach provides 
a larger estimate of heritability (38.4%) while the second 
approach provides a smaller, yet still substantial estimate 
(29.15%). Both represent the proportion of behavior that 
is not expected to be changed due to training. 
DISCUSSION 
Results of this study have several implications for 
research. First of all, findings about the genetic influences 
may suggest stability of relevant traits over time. Genetic 
manifestation is durable, and so if the genetic makeup 
influences at least some of the variance in security 
behavior, the unsecure user behavior we observe may be 
more durable than previously anticipated. 
Theoretical understanding of the mechanisms underlying 
the genetic influences could help us unpack the specific 
sources of such influences. Future studies should also 
explore multivariate models using other measures of 
behavioral security to triangulate the findings.  
Future studies will also be able to adopt the twin study 
technique to distinguish biological versus environmental 
antecedents to a host of IS usage outcomes. Examples are 
attitudes such as negativism and impatience, intentions 
such as adoption or system usage, and behaviors such as 
error rates, learning speed, cooperation, systems misuse 
(e.g., D'Arcy et al., 2009), and reactions to managerial 
interventions such as fear appeals (Boss and Galletta, 
2008). These are but a few of the potential breakthroughs 
that a twin study can afford. Future studies can also be 
extended to family studies, revealing a more detailed 
environmental component. 
One implication of our findings is that previous emphasis 
on security education or training may need to be 
reconsidered. Notions that behavioral security weaknesses 
can be resolved through education or training alone may 
be problematic with taking into consideration the 
biological basis of unsecure behavior. In spite of the 
growing and frequent warnings, many users just do not 
seem to internalize training tips. By knowing the extent to 
which differences in these secure behaviors are 
determined by genetic makeup versus environmental 
forces, this research can help managers specify areas 
where managerial intervention (i.e., one form of 
environmental influence) may be the most (as well as 
least) fruitful.  
While practitioners often provide warnings and 
educational experiences to aid users in working more 
safely with information technologies, our study would 
provide perhaps more realistic expectations for such 
programs, and even serve to persuade management to 
deploy funds towards alternative solutions. For instance, 
if workers insist on sharing passwords, and do not heed 
warnings about that practice, management might redeploy 
training funds towards inexpensive fingerprint recognition 
devices. Also, if workers fail to make backups, software 
that makes automatic network backups might be 
purchased instead. 
Findings from twin studies will also benefit educators or 
parents, who strive to understand how to foster secure 
online behavior and reduce the rate of cyberbullying or 
other forms of cybercrime. Twin and adoption studies 
have found very little influence that the shared family 
environment has on shaping personality or intelligence 
(Plomin and Caspi, 1999, Plomin and Spinath, 2004). 
These findings sent shock waves through the research 
community on parenting, which always theorized a strong 
relationship between a positive family environment with 
positive outcomes in personality or intelligence. 
Moreover, mental disorders such as ADHD or autism 
were blamed on poor parenting until behavioral genetics 
research provided evidence of strong heritability. The 
finding that these traits are highly heritable and are 
resistant to family influence not only challenged parenting 
theories, but also transformed parenting practices. 
Behavioral genetic findings of IS security behavior may 
prove to challenge fundamental assumptions in a wide 
array of IS practices.  
Findings from the study reported here must be considered 
in light of several methodological limitations. First, while 
the sample size for MZ twins is reasonable, the DZ group 
is considerably smaller. Unequal sample sizes are rather 
common in published twin studies, especially those with 
data collected from the Twins Days Festival. This is 
probably because the festival events tend to attract MZ 
rather than DZ twins. There is no reason to suspect that 
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the unequal samples sizes have compromised our analysis 
in any way, but our future work will involve recruiting 
more DX twins into the study at the 2013 Festival to 
make sure the results are robust. Moreover, current 
findings are based on a single measure of behavioral 
security. Estimates of multivariate ACE models would not 
only strengthen our understanding, they will also help us 
uncover mediating or moderating processes that shed light 
on biological mechanisms underlying genetic influences.  
CONCLUSION 
Behavioral genetics, the study of the genetics of behavior, 
offer many opportunities to bridge these gaps in 
biological research of IS. By employing the classic twin 
design, commonly used in behavioral genetics research, 
this study is among the first to unpack the genetic versus 
environmental determinants of individual differences in 
information systems, using the context of security 
behavior. The study of genetic versus environmental 
influences have the potential promise to push the 
boundaries and challenge the basic assumptions of many 
IS theories beyond the security literature. A fuller 
understanding of genetic influences will only improve 
theoretical explanations for IS user behavior. 
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